Facilitating Collusion with Spot-Price Contracting

Research Seminars: Virtual Market Design Seminar

The paper presented in this Virtual Marketing Design Seminar investigates the competitive effects of spot-price contracting, in which a buyer and seller contract to transact at a future date at the price prevailing in that market at that future date (the ''spot price''); such contracts are ubiquitous in the beef-processing industry, among others. The paper shows that spot-price contracting can facilitate collusion: When such contracts are available, firms can maintain monopsonistic prices at much lower market concentrations than in standard models of Bertrand competition, and some degree of non-competitive pricing can be maintained for any market concentration. The authors also show that the effect of differentiation on collusion in this setting is ambiguous: Monopsonistic pricing is most easily maintained at either high or low levels of differentiation, while more competitive pricing arises at intermediate levels of differentiation.

Veranstaltungsort

Online

Personen

Prof. John Hatfield PhD

John Hatfield // The University of Texas, Austin, USA

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