On The Constrained Efficiency of Strategy-Proof Random Assignment

Research Seminars: Virtual Market Design Seminar

The paper presented in this Virtual Market Design Seminar studies the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex ante. However, the authors show that there is no mechanism that is likewise (i) strategy-proof and (ii) boundedly invariant, and that Pareto-dominates Random Serial Dictatorship. Moreover, the same holds for all mechanisms that are ex-post efficient, strategy-proof, and boundedly invariant: no such mechanism is dominated by any other mechanism that is likewise strategy-proof and boundedly invariant.

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Online

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Prof. Lars Ehlers PhD

Lars Ehlers // Université de Montréal, Kanada

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