In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for n = 2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n ≥ 3 it requires that one agent receives no cake. We show that a…
Contributions to Edited Volumes and Conference Proceedings
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2019
Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We find that envy-free…
We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. Complete contracts conditioning on all…
We analyze the problem of a buyer who chooses a supplier for a long-term relationship via an auction. The buyer lacks commitment to not renegotiate the terms of the contract in the long run. Thus, suppliers are…
We propose the notion of k-integration as a measure of equality of opportunity in social networks. A social network is k-integrated if there is a path of length at most k between any two individuals, thus…
Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses…
