Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over a set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a…

We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without…

We study how framing interplays with information design. Whereas Sender conceives all contingencies separately, Receiver cannot initially distinguish among some of them, i.e., has a coarse frame. To influence…

We examine a setting of independent private value auctions where bidders can covertly acquire gradual information about their valuations. We demonstrate that a dynamic pivot mechanism implements the rst-best…

We assess the impact of discrimination on Black individuals' job networks across the U.S. using a two-stage  eld experiment with 400+  fictitious LinkedIn pro les. In the  first stage, we vary race via…

Though the use of tracking policies to stratify students is commonplace, evidence concerning the effects of ability-based tracking on student performance is mixed. Using rich data from the Hungarian secondary…

Microcredit, a financial tool providing uncollateralized loans to low-income individuals, has seen a shift from joint-liability (JL) to individual liability (IL) lending models. This article tests a theory…