Uncertainty Creates Incentives for Footballers

Research

Footballers, whose nomination for their national team is uncertain, are substantially more motivated in the months approaching a world cup or European championship than players certain of their nomination. Nominated players even perform worse in that time period. The prospective participation in the national team is a particular motivation for younger footballers to boost their performances. This is the result of a recent study conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). The study has been designed to analyse the incentives deriving from nomination contests using data from the German Football League.

The study evaluates various performance features such as scored goals, successful tackles or received passes in the German Football League seasons 2006/2007 and 2007/2008. This period covers both the qualification phase for the European Championship 2008, which took place in Austria and Switzerland, and the time between successful qualification and the announcement of national team rosters for the Championship. This implies that, during the months approaching the European Championship 2008, many international players in the German Football League had the opportunity to recommend themselves to the national team of their respective country by increasing their performance. Overall, the study examined 165 players from 12 countries, who took part in the nomination contest for the European Champion-ship 2008, and compared their performances with 81 players from 33 countries, who were not considered for the Euro Cup 2008 in the first place and did not take part in the nomination contest.

It turns out that incentives in the nomination contest are distributed asymmetrically. The reaction of players with a medium probability of being included in the national team is highly positive as these players face the opportunity of playing for their home country in the Euro Cup 2008. In the case of footballers expecting to be nominated, the effect of the nomination competition has not been found to be positive and, in part, even negative. For example, players with a medium probability of being nominated scored on average 27 percent more shots on goal than players, who did not take part in the nomination contest in the months approaching the Euro Cup 2008. Players, who were nominated with certainty, however, did not score more goals than players in the comparison group. On average, they even had 1.5 fewer successful duels per match than fellow players and oppo-nents, who did not participate in the nomination contest. On average, a player won 12.2 duels per match.

Showing positive performance on the playing field is most profitable for those players, who are not certain of their nomination, as they can significantly influence their nomination decision. For players, who are certain of their nomination or exclusion, however, only little incentives for boosting their performances remain, as they can only do little to influence the decision. Players certain of their nomination even contain themselves in club matches to avoid injuries and risking their participation in the big event.

Furthermore, the study shows that younger players react strongest to the possibility of being included in the national team. Footballers in the nomination contest at the age of 20 achieved on average 4.5 ball contacts per match more than players at the same age, who did not participate in the nomination contest. Players at the age of 30, who had the possibility of being included in the national team, even had around one ball contact less than players at the same age, who did not participate in the nomination contest. On average, players in the German Football League achieved 57 ball contacts per match. This shows that the participation in an international football cup is more important for the future career of a young player than for the career of an older player, who may already see the end of his active playing time.

The study's findings are relevant in many situations, for example in human resources. To what extent a potential promotion could lead to increased motivation among the candidates depends on their respective chances of actually obtaining the promotion. An employee who expects to be promoted with a very high or a very low probability does not have much incentive to outperform, he may even underperform. In contrast, a candidate facing a close race but seeing a realistic chance of winning will put much effort in obtaining the promotion. Finally, a younger employee will be more motivated by the perspective of a promotion than older colleagues as his career is still to come.

Contact

Hannes Ullrich, E-mail: hannes.ullrich@zew.de