Rent Sharing to Control Non-Cartel Supply in the German Cement Market

The project was financially supported by the State Government of Baden-Württemberg, Germany, through the research program Strengthening Efficiency and Competitiveness in the European Knowledge Economies (SEEK). We are grateful to Cartel Damage Claims (CDC), Brussels, for providing us with the data set and to the coeditor, two anonymous referees, Sven Heim, Patrick Legros, Christine Zulehner, and participants at the 12th CRESSE International Conference on Competition & Regulation for helpful and constructive comments. We also thank Cung Truong Hoang for excellent research assistance. Hüschelrath was involved in a study of cartel damage estimations which was financially supported by CDC. The study is published in German (K. Hüschelrath, N. Leheyda, K. Müller, and T. Veith (2012), Schadensermittlung und Schadensersatz bei Hardcore-Kartellen: Ökonomische Methoden und rechtlicher Rahmen, Baden-Baden). The present paper is the result of a separate research project.

Harrington, Joseph E., Kai Hüschelrath and Ulrich Laitenberger (2018), Rent Sharing to Control Non-Cartel Supply in the German Cement Market, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Volume 27, Issue 1 , 149-166