Klimaabkommen von Paris: Die vereinbarten dynamischen Anreize wirken kontraproduktiv

Hopes in the 2015 Paris Agreement are high that global warming will be limited to the two-degree target agreed on by the various signatory states. To this end, substantial climate protection contributions are indispensable. One of the agreement’s key components is a dynamic system of incentives known as “ratcheting”. This system requires signatory states to provide insight into their national climate protection contributions on a regular basis, and to step up these efforts over time. However, it remains to be seen how this system of incentives impacts the behaviour of the players involved. Consequently, it is unclear whether the approach adopted in the Paris Agreement is suitable to ensure the attainment of the two-degree target. In this ZEW policy brief, researchers report on a laboratory experiment conducted to investigate the effects of ratcheting under controlled conditions. The insights gained give little cause for optimism. The laboratory experiment was funded via the project “Incentives, Fairness and Compliance in International Environmental Agreements (InFairCom)” by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Further information on InFairCom

Gallier, Carlo, Martin Kesternich and Bodo Sturm (2019), Klimaabkommen von Paris: Die vereinbarten dynamischen Anreize wirken kontraproduktiv, ZEW policy brief No. 19-08, Mannheim