On The Constrained Efficiency of Strategy-Proof Random Assignment

Research Seminars: Virtual Market Design Seminar

The paper presented in this Virtual Market Design Seminar studies the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex ante. However, the authors show that there is no mechanism that is likewise (i) strategy-proof and (ii) boundedly invariant, and that Pareto-dominates Random Serial Dictatorship. Moreover, the same holds for all mechanisms that are ex-post efficient, strategy-proof, and boundedly invariant: no such mechanism is dominated by any other mechanism that is likewise strategy-proof and boundedly invariant.

Venue

Online

04.12.2023
16:00 – 17:00 (CET)

The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes: 45 minutes of presentation and 15 minutes for both comments and questions.

We will experiment with various methods for questions: A moderator collects questions during the presentation. Speakers will be encouraged to pause every few slides to allow a gap for questions. The moderator will relay clarification questions or unmute selectively during the talk. Remaining questions will be collected and asked in the discussion period.

Just like with other initiated virtual seminars, these rules are subject to change as we gain experience with how to handle the seminar most efficiently.

The idea for this format was borrowed from the Chamberlain Seminar. Other online seminars can be found at the AEA website.

The Virtual Market Design Seminar is an open online and inter-institutional seminar. Although inspired by seminars cancelled due to the COVID-19, we intend to continue post-pandemic. Seminars cover all fields from market design. Talks take place bi-weekly on Monday at 4:00-5:00pm CEST (Paris time) on Zoom.

Unit