1. Refereed Journal // 2018

    Eliciting preferences for urban parks

    The hedonic pricing method has been used extensively to obtain implicit prices for availability of urban green space, but few have obtained households' preference parameters. We elicit preferences and estimate…

  2. Refereed Journal // 2018

    (Fast) kostenloser Nahverkehr: Dominanz der Preis- oder Verhaltenswirkung?

    Due to exceeding nitrogen dioxide levels in German cities and an impending lawsuit of the EU, a debate on free public local transport as a potential solution has evolved starting in summer 2018. This…

  3. Refereed Journal // 2018

    Strategic Delegation and International Permit Markets: Why Linking May Fail

    We analyse a delegation problem in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then…

  4. Refereed Journal // 2018

    Climate Policy under Factor Mobility: A (Differentiated) Case for Capital Taxation

    In a general equilibrium model with two periods and a finite fossil resource, I analyze the non-cooperative climate policies of symmetric countries that are in competition for mobile factors of production…

  5. Refereed Journal // 2018

    Flexibility in the Market for International Carbon Credits and Price Dynamics Difference with European Allowances

    The Paris Agreement establishes a mechanism which allows a Party to benefit from greenhouse gas emissions reductions conducted in a host Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution. In this context,…

  6. Refereed Journal // 2018

    Tax refunds and income manipulation: evidence from the EITC

    Welfare programs are important in terms of reducing poverty, although they create incentives for recipients to maximize their income by either reducing their labor supply or manipulating their taxable income. In…

  7. Refereed Journal // 2018

    Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets

    When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the…