Undergraduate Course Allocation through Competitive Markets

Research Seminars: Virtual Market Design Seminar

The paper presented in this Virtual Market Design Seminar considers the problem of allocating courses to students in post-secondary institutions. The authors propose a mechanism that assigns course seats based on student preferences and respects course priorities. This mechanism uses fake money and competitive equlibrium to allocate courses without transfers and has desirable theoretical properties in terms of stability, efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness. In simulations drawing from real-world university data, they demonstrate that its outcomes improve student satisfaction and allocation fairness over the outcomes of several celebrated mechanisms.

Venue

Online

11.11.2024
16:00 – 17:00 (CET)

The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes: 45 minutes of presentation and 15 minutes for both comments and questions.

We will experiment with various methods for questions: A moderator collects questions during the presentation. Speakers will be encouraged to pause every few slides to allow a gap for questions. The moderator will relay clarification questions or unmute selectively during the talk. Remaining questions will be collected and asked in the discussion period.

Just like with other initiated virtual seminars, these rules are subject to change as we gain experience with how to handle the seminar most efficiently.

The idea for this format was borrowed from the Chamberlain Seminar. Other online seminars can be found at the AEA website.

The Virtual Market Design Seminar is an open online and inter-institutional seminar. The seminar was inspired by events that could not take place in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The resulting positive experiences ensured that it was continued after the pandemic. Seminars cover all fields from market design. Talks take place bi-weekly on Monday at 4:00-5:00pm CEST (Paris time) on Zoom.

Unit