Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. Non-Refereed Journal // 2024

    Alleinerziehende in der Betreuungsplatzvergabe: Status quo und Handlungsempfehlungen

    Alleinerziehende Eltern und ihre Kinder profitieren besonders von frühkindlichen Bildungs- und Betreuungsangeboten. Dennoch erhalten in Deutschland knapp ein Drittel der Alleinerziehenden mit Betreuungsbedarf…

  2. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 24-025 // 2024

    Analysis of a Capacity-Based Redispatch Mechanism

    This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market…

  3. Refereed Journal // 2024

    Combinatorial auctions for renewable energy – potentials and challenges

    Combinatorial auctions, which allow bidders to bid not only on individual items but also on packages of items and to express complementary and substitute relationships between items, have rarely been used for…

  4. Refereed Journal // 2024

    Information Acquisition and Diffusion in Markets

    Consumers acquire information through their own search efforts or through word-of-mouth
    communication within their social network. Information diffusion leads to free-riding and
    less active search. Free-riding…

  5. Refereed Journal // 2024

    Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions

    The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of…

  6. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 23-051 // 2023

    Revenue Maximization with Partially Verifiable Information

    I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially…

  7. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 23-050 // 2023

    Mechanism Design for Unequal Societies

    We study optimal mechanisms for a utilitarian designer who seeks to assign a finite number of goods to a group of ex ante heterogeneous agents with unit demand. The agents have heterogeneous marginal utilities…