Clark, Robert, Decio Coviello und Adriano De Leverano (forthcoming), Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.

De Leverano, Adriano (2023), Clustered Bids in First-Price Auctions: Collusion or Competition?, Economics Letters 233, 111393.

De Leverano, Adriano und Friedrich Heinemann (2022), Wahl in Italien: Bewährungsprobe für die EU-Governance, Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 102 (10) , 738-739.

De Leverano, Adriano und Susmita Baulia (2023), A new Indicator to implement effective Spending Review Policies in the Public Procurement for standardized Goods, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 23-063, Mannheim

Clark, Robert, Decio Coviello und Adriano De Leverano (2021), Centralized Procurement and Delivery Times: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Italy, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 21-063, Mannheim

De Leverano, Adriano (2020), Post COVID EU Recovery: Is There Room to Invest in Healthcare?, ZEW-Kurzexpertise Nr. 20-14, Mannheim

Clark, Robert, Decio Coviello und Adriano De Leverano (2020), Complementary Bidding and the Collusive Arrangement: Evidence from an Antitrust Investigation, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 20-052, Mannheim

De Leverano, Adriano (2019), Collusion Through Market Sharing Agreements: Evidence from Quebec‘s Road Paving Market, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 19-053, Mannheim

5th "Economics of Public Procurement" Workshop, ZEW Mannheim, Deutschland, 2023 weitere Informationen

4th "Economics of Public Procurement" Workshop, ZEW Mannheim, Deutschland, 2022 weitere Informationen

HS 2023: "Quantitative Methods for Lawyers", Universität Mannheim, Deutschland

2020 - gegenwärtig: Research Fellow, Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation (MaCCI), Deutschland