Tax Strategy Disclosure

The paper presented in this ZEW Research Seminar investigates the effects of a qualitative tax disclosure mandate aimed at improving the availability of tax information and tax compliance by imposing reputational costs for firms. The authors use, as an exogenous shock, the 2016 UK reform that required the disclosure of tax strategy details by large businesses. They find that treated firms—those that must publish a tax strategy report—significantly increase the volume of tax strategy disclosure in their annual reports but also provide more boilerplate statements. Disclosure volume and boilerplate increase the most for high public pressure and tax aggressive firms. They show the important role that public pressure plays in facilitating this increase in disclosure volume, even in the absence of the mandate. The authors document no significant effect on tax avoidance. Their findings indicate that this requirement for qualitative tax disclosure has incentivized firms to portray themselves as “good tax citizens” without actually changing their tax practices.