Prof. Dr. Vitali Gretschko

Market Design

Professor Dr. Vitali Gretschko is a ZEW Research Associate. He works in close cooperation with ZEW's research unit “Market Design”.

Further information on Professor Dr. Gretschko

Contact information

Prof. Dr. Vitali Gretschko

Research Associate Email vitali.gretschko@zew.de

Unit: Market Design

Selected Publications

Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions

Gretschko, Vitali and Helene Mass (2024), Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions, Theoretical Economics 19(1), 61-93.

To the publication

Information design in sequential procurement

Fugger, Nicolas, Vitali Gretschko and Martin Pollrich (2022), Information design in sequential procurement, Games and Economic Behavior 135, 79-85.

To the publication

Social Norms, Sanctions, and Conditional Entry in Markets with Externalities: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment

Riehm, Tobias, Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, Vitali Gretschko and Peter Werner (2022), Social Norms, Sanctions, and Conditional Entry in Markets with Externalities: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment, Journal of Public Economics 212.

To the publication

Incomplete Contracts in Multi-Period Procurement

Gretschko, Vitali and Martin Pollrich (2021), Incomplete Contracts in Multi-Period Procurement, Management Science.

To the publication

Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement

Mass, Helene, Achim Wambach, Nicolas Fugger and Vitali Gretschko (2020), Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12(3), 189-245.

To the publication

A Procurement Mechanism to Assign Refugee Quotas

Gretschko, Vitali (2018), A Procurement Mechanism to Assign Refugee Quotas, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 175(1), 53.

To the publication

Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction

Bichler, Martin, Vitali Gretschko and Maarten Janssen (2017), Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction, Telecommunications Policy.

Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?

Gillen, Philippe, Vitali Gretschko and Alexander Rasch (2016), Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?, Economic Theory Bulletin.

To the publication

Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations

Gretschko, Vitali and Achim Wambach (2016), Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations, RAND Journal of Economics 47, 914-934.

To the publication

Excess information acquisition in auctions

Gretschko, Vitali and Alexander Rajko (2015), Excess information acquisition in auctions, Experimental Economics 18, 335-355.

To the publication

On the strictly descending multi-unit auction

Gretschko, Vitali, Alexander Rasch and Achim Wambach (2014), On the strictly descending multi-unit auction, Journal of Mathematical Economics 50, 79-85.

To the publication

Information acquisition during a descending auction

Gretschko, Vitali and Achim Wambach (2014), Information acquisition during a descending auction, Economic Theory 55, 731-751.

To the publication

Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt

Wambach, Achim, Axel Ockenfels and Vitali Gretschko (2024), Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt, Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 104(11) , 794-799.

To the publication

Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign

Wambach, Achim, Vitali Gretschko and Thilo Klein (2019), Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium 48, Bd. 4 , 22-28.

To the publication

Was gutes Marktdesign leisten kann

Gretschko, Vitali (2016), Was gutes Marktdesign leisten kann, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung .

To the publication

Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer

Gretschko, Vitali, Nicolas Fugger and Philippe Gillen (2016), Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer, Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 96. Jahrgang,Heft 9 , 626-627.

To the publication

Electricity Market Design 2030-2050: Moving Towards Implementation

Ashour Novirdoust, Amir, Rajon Bhuiyan, Martin Bichler, Hans Ulrich Buhl, Gilbert Fridgen, Carina Fugger, Vitali Gretschko, Lisa Hanny, Johannes Knörr, Karsten Neuhoff, Christoph Neumann, Marion Ott, Jörn C. Richstein, Maximilian Rinck, Felix Röhrich, Michael Schöpf, Amelie Sitzmann, Johannes Wagner and Martin Weibelzahl (2021), Electricity Market Design 2030-2050: Moving Towards Implementation, Fraunhofer Publica , Sankt Augustin.

To the publication

Electricity Spot Market Design 2030-2050

Gretschko, Vitali, Martin Bichler, Hans Ulrich Buhl, Lisa Hanny, Marion Ott, Amir Ashour Novirdoust, Caroline Bojung, Gilbert Fridgen, Johannes Knörr, Felipe Maldonado, Karsten Neuhoff, Christoph Neumann, Jörn C. Richstein, Maximilian Rinck, Michael Schöpf, Paul Schott, Amelie Sitzmann, Johannes Wagner, Jonathan Wagner and Martin Weibelzahl (2021), Electricity Spot Market Design 2030-2050, Fraunhofer Publica , Sankt Augustin.

To the publication

Bidding Complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions

Gretschko, Vitali, Stephan Knapek and Achim Wambach (2017), Bidding Complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions, in: Martin Bichler, Jacob Gorree Cambridge University Press

An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism With Covert Information Acquisition

Gretschko, Vitali and Jasmina Simon (2024), An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism With Covert Information Acquisition, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 24-081, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Das Verhandlungsgebot im Telekommunikationsmarkt: Analyse und Designempfehlungen

Gretschko, Vitali, Axel Ockenfels and Achim Wambach (2024), Das Verhandlungsgebot im Telekommunikationsmarkt: Analyse und Designempfehlungen, ZEW policy brief No. 24-17, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen

Gretschko, Vitali and Achim Wambach (2021), Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen, Stellungnahme des ZEW Mannheim im Rahmen der öffentlichen Konsultation der Bundesnetzagentur, ZEW expert brief No. 21-07, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen

Gretschko, Vitali and Marion Ott (2021), Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen, ZEW policy brief No. 21-03, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Social Norms and Market Behavior – Evidence From a Large Population Sample

Riehm, Tobias, Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, Vitali Gretschko and Peter Werner (2021), Social Norms and Market Behavior – Evidence From a Large Population Sample, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 21-017, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Procurement

Gretschko, Vitali and Martin Pollrich (2019), Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Procurement, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 19-040, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Sequential Procurement with Limited Commitment

Fugger, Nicolas, Vitali Gretschko and Martin Pollrich (2019), Sequential Procurement with Limited Commitment, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 19-030, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-Price Auctions

Gretschko, Vitali and Helene Mass (2018), Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-Price Auctions, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 18-056, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Contract Design with Limited Commitment

Gretschko, Vitali and Achim Wambach (2018), Contract Design with Limited Commitment, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 18-054, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Contract (Re-)Negotiation with Private and Common Values

Gretschko, Vitali and Achim Wambach (2017), Contract (Re-)Negotiation with Private and Common Values, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 17-056, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Imitation Perfection – A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement

Mass, Helene, Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko and Achim Wambach (2017), Imitation Perfection – A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 17-058, Mannheim

To the publication

(PDF)

Künftiges Energiemarktdesign – Ausgestaltung eines wettbewerbsgesteuerten Kapazitätsmarktmodells

Gretschko, Vitali, Marion Ott and Philip Zilke (2023), Künftiges Energiemarktdesign – Ausgestaltung eines wettbewerbsgesteuerten Kapazitätsmarktmodells, Monopolkommission, Bonn