The Impact of Fiscal Equalization on Local Expenditure Policies - Theory and Evidence from Germany

This paper uses a simple model of fiscal competition in taxes and public inputs among local jurisdictions to analyze the incentive effects of fiscal equalization transfers. We find that a budget-compensated increase in the contribution rate to a system of fiscal equalization not only induces higher local tax rates (e.g., Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006) but also lower budgetary shares of the public input to production. The subsequent empirical analysis is based on a rich data set of German municipalities and provides strong evidence for the existence of an incentive of fiscal equalization transfers on local expenditure policies.

Hauptmeier, Sebastian (2007), The Impact of Fiscal Equalization on Local Expenditure Policies - Theory and Evidence from Germany, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 07-081, Mannheim.