Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the…

We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a…

In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability. However, experimental and empirical evidence suggests that agent's expectations depend on direct…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information…

In many markets buyers are poorly informed about which firms sell the product (product availability) and prices, and therefore have to spend time to obtain this information. In contrast, sellers typically have a…

I study an entrepreneur’s incentives to build a network using a blockchain. The entrepreneur can either build the network using a regular company and retain control of the network, or build the network using a…