Cartel Breakdowns and Merger Activity

Cartel Breakdowns and Merger Activity

Period: 01.09.2012 – 31.08.2013

Cartel agreements between firms typcially aim at reducing competition and increasing joint profits. Due to the fact that such agreements regularly cause substantial economic harm in the form of elevated prices and reduced innovation activities, cartels are a major infringement of competition laws in Germany and the European Union. After the breakdown of cartels, anecdotal evidence often points towards an increased merger activity in the respective industries thereby raising the question whether former cartel members systematically try to replace the lost cartel-related market power by merger-related market power. Against this background, the project aims at investigating a possible relationship between cartel breakdowns and merger activity. As part of this endeavor, we also investigate the question how mergers after cartel breakdowns affect corporate values.

Project members

Kai Hüschelrath

Kai Hüschelrath

Project Coordinator
Research Associate

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Mariela Borell

Mariela Borell

Senior Researcher

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Selected Publications

Do Cartel Breakdowns Induce Mergers? Evidence from EC Cartel Cases

Hüschelrath, Kai and Florian Smuda (2013), Do Cartel Breakdowns Induce Mergers? Evidence from EC Cartel Cases, European Competition Journal 9 (2) , 407-429

Contact

Research Associate
Kai Hüschelrath
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