Incomplete Employment Contracts, Incentives, and Innovations

Incomplete Employment Contracts, Incentives, and Innovations

Period: 01.02.2001 – 31.01.2003

Personnel management departments are always seeking to develop new strategies that offer incentives to employees and that are intended to increase productivity: the introduction of innovative payments systems or flexible worktime are frequently the results of such strategies. The elimination of levels of authority, the coupling of salaries to corporate success, and seasonal accounts are thus frequently under discussion. Companies hope that the above mentioned personnel management methods will ensure a more efficient remuneration of their employees, as work and wage no longer depend on each other in a solely one-dimensional and mono-causal manner. Flexible worktime is intended is increase the scope of action and productivity of employees and to optimise personnel placement. Enterprises also hope for a reduction of employee fluctuation and absenteeism rates. Frequently, however, the decision-makers do not know enough about the effectiveness of innovative personnel strategies or recoil from the idea of supposedly high reorganisation costs. The Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) will explore in an evolution study how effective new personnel management methods are and which goals actually are attained. At present, the research department Labour Markets, Human Resources and Social Security is carrying out a project on this issue. To this end, we will seek cooperation partners from enterprises or management consulting agencies in order to analyse on the basis of operational data which impact personnel management innovations have on corporate success. Companies that are interested in an empirical evaluation of their reorganisation measures in personnel administration will have to provide data on their personnel structure, their payments system, and their worktime regulations. Performance indicators such as performance appraisals, personal or group-based productivity indicators, or performance targets before and after the introduction of new payments and/or worktime systems are also important. The data will be used exclusively for the evaluation of the respective innovations and will not be disclosed to third parties. The ZEW will perform a detailed analysis of the effects of new personnel management methods in your company and will provide you with the results in a written documentation. We will finance this evaluation with internal funds of the institute, however, we cannot assume any costs when making the data available to you. The ZEW is a leading research institute that distinguishes itself in empirical, evidence-based analyses while maintaining the contact to practice. The institute collaborates closely with companies, universities and scientific research institutes in Germany, Europe, the USA, and the rest of the world. The transfer of new economic insights to companies, decision-makers in politics and administration, to the scientific community, institutions and organisations is a major concern of the ZEW.

Project members

Thomas Zwick

Thomas Zwick

Project Coordinator
Research Associate

To the profile
Miriam Beblo

Miriam Beblo

Senior Researcher

To the profile

Selected Publications

Empirische Determinanten des Widerstandes von Mitarbeitern gegen Innovationen

Zwick, Thomas (2003), Empirische Determinanten des Widerstandes von Mitarbeitern gegen Innovationen, Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 55 , 45-59

Employee resistance against innovations

Zwick, Thomas (2002), Employee resistance against innovations, International Journal of Manpower 23 (6) , 542-552

Produktivitätswirkung von Mitarbeiterbeteiligung: Der Einfluss von unbeobachteter Heterogenität

Wolf, Elke and Thomas Zwick (2002), Produktivitätswirkung von Mitarbeiterbeteiligung: Der Einfluss von unbeobachteter Heterogenität, Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 35 , 123-132

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