R&D cooperation and R&D intensity: Theory and Micro-Econometric Evidence for Germany

This paper develops a three stage oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D expenditure and product market competition. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation with other firms. In the second stage the level of R&D investment is determined. Finally, firms compete in a Cournot–oligopoly product market. While earlier models on R&D cooperation only considered process innovation, the model presented here also takes product innovation into account. It is shown that the optimal R&D investment has virtually the same structure for both process and product innovation. The main hypothesis of our theoretical model are tested in the empirical part of this paper.

Kaiser, Ulrich and Georg Licht (1998), R&D cooperation and R&D intensity: Theory and Micro-Econometric Evidence for Germany, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 98-32, Mannheim.